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Abstract 
We use a Contract Theory framework to analyze the mechanisms of Eurozone financial 
governance through the Stability and Growth Pact (SGP), with a focus on centralization vs. 
decentralization and incentive problems. By constructing a Stackelberg game model with n 
Ministries of Finance as the first movers, and European Central Bank as the second mover, we show 
that each government can create growth in its own country (self-benefit) by increasing government 
spending, but it will increase inflation and the euro value will fall. Since these effects are shared 
equally by euro countries (cost sharing), there exists an incentive to free-ride on other countries. We 
then analyze a solution to the free-rider problem through the penalty scheme in the SGP, and derive a 
second best solution where a commitment not to renegotiate penalties ex-post is impossible. Lastly, 
we derive the parameter conditions for optimizing the EU’s current allocation of authority, “divided 
authority structure,” which consists of Monetary Centralization and Fiscal Decentralization. We find 
that what is effective is “contingency dependent governance” based on “relative sovereignty,” where 
there is a division of authority as the basic structure and the main body governs with leading 
sovereignty depending on the contingency. 
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1. Introduction 
 
In this paper, we analyze the mechanisms of eurozone financial governance through the 
Stability and Growth Pact (SGP) in theory and in reality, with a focus on centralization and 
decentralization, and incentive structures.  
We start by describing the institutional framework of the period 2002 to 2003 when there 
were 12 eurozone countries.1 
The structure regarding the allocation of authority is both a centralization of authority on 
interest policy, which rests with the European Central Bank (ECB) and a decentralization of 
authority on fiscal policy, which rests with each country. This is to say that the eurozone has a 
structure of Monetary Centralization and Fiscal Decentralization under a common currency (the 
euro). Thus, a structure of strategic interdependence emerges between “the interest rate policy 
by the ECB for maintaining the value of the euro” and a “national deficit poured away by each 
country”. 
The major factor making fiscal stabilization difficult is the “Prisoner's Dilemma” problem in 
financial governance. When other countries abide by the fiscal rule, one of the countries has an 
incentive to become a free rider. Its neglect may cause other countries to follow, causing a loss 
of the binding force of the SGP. It may lead to further difficulties in maintaining the value of the 
euro, which theoretically corresponds to the phenomenon of a “Tragedy of Commons”. 
The mechanism for financial governance under fiscal decentralization lies with the SGP, which 
is a governance mechanism that imposes the condition of “an annual national deficit below 3% 
of GDP, and a government debt of lower than 60% of GDP” upon member nations, at a regional 
level. 
As an institutional mechanism for the SGP, the European Commission (EC) is allowed to be 
an agent that monitors the national deficits of eurozone countries and is provided with the 
authority to warn that penalties will be applied to countries that violate the rules. 
The European Commission (EC) checks for divergence from the financial stabilization plans 
that member nations have submitted. This serves as an early warning of any risk exceeding 3% 
of GDP. The European Commission (EC) employs excessive national deficit procedures against 
                                                 
1The institutional description below is mainly based on Tsuranuki (2005), which pursues the institutional 
essence of eurozone financial governance from the viewpoint of political science. De Grauwe (2007) 
analyzes the costs and benefits associated with having one currency, as well as the practical issues 
involved with monetary union. However, it is not the contract/game theoretical analysis. 
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the continuation or deterioration in the divergence. It requires measures to be taken within four 
months and a resolution within one year. A penalty warning is given for breaches.  
The penalty is prescribed at 0.5% of GDP as a maximum. This involves “large amounts of 
money”. When the amount of the penalty is adopted by a vote in the Eurozone Finance 
Ministers Council, the penalty becomes binding. 
However, there is a divided structure where the European Commission (EC) has the warning 
authority regarding the penalty application and the Eurozone Finance Ministers Council has the 
decision-making authority. There exists room for approaching the Ministry of Finance in each 
country in order for countries in violation to avoid having to pay a “huge” penalty, i.e. there is 
room for renegotiation. 
Whether the penalty is indeed imposed is determined by Qualified Majority Voting (QMV) in 
the Finance Ministers Council. Adoption requires a two-thirds or greater number of votes, thus a 
blocking minority becomes applicable with one-third or more votes. The formation of the 
blocking minority by a major power in violation may be relatively easy. 
There are two cases where institutional limitations were exposed in the period 2002 to 2003. 
Case 1: Decision not to adopt an early warning against Germany, January 30, 2002 
The European Commission (EC) issued an early warning. However, Germany was able to 
secure a blocking minority. In order to avoid a wavering in the credibility of the SGP due to a 
defeat in a vote, the Finance Ministers Council did not adopt the warning issued by the 
European Commission (EC) in exchange for a commitment by Germany to reduce its national 
deficit. 
Case 2: Rejection of the warning against France and Germany by the Eurozone Finance 
Ministers Council, November, 2003 
 The warning to force France and Germany, to which a second warning of an excessive 
national deficit procedure had been issued, to reduce their national deficits was rejected by 
QMV. A proposal was passed on the temporarily shelved penalty given to Germany.  
From these two cases, which exposed certain institutional limitations, we see that even if the 
penalty included in the SGP is recommended by the European Commission (EC), it is extremely 
difficult for it to be adopted by the Finance Ministers Council, which determines whether the 
penalty should actually be invoked. 2 
We can see a game structure in which the European Central Bank (ECB) raises the policy rate 
to maintain the value of the euro against any free-rider nation that pours away national deficits 
when the penalty function of the SGP to suppress a national deficit under fiscal decentralization 
                                                 
2Though one might have a concern that these two cases are relatively old (2002 and 2003), we believe 
that they were the fundamental sources which undermined the credibility and effectiveness of the penalty 
scheme in the Stability and Growth Pact. 
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does not work. 
From the above description, the institutional framework of the eurozone can be shown in the 
following figure. 
         Monetary Centralization, Fiscal Decentralization and  
Eurozone financial governance through the Stability and Growth Pact (SGP) 
(SGP operator)  
European Commission      European Central Bank (ECB)  
            (EC)                  single (common) policy rate    
     Penalty       Warning        
  Deviation: Free rider   Determined by a vote in the Finance Ministers Council   
Ministry of Finance 1, 2 ⋅⋅ Ministry of Finance n=17 
     MOF 1  ⋅⋅⋅⋅⋅⋅⋅⋅⋅⋅⋅⋅⋅⋅⋅   MOF n  
 Financial spending       Financial spending  
 
In this paper, we use a Game/Contract Theory framework to analyze the mechanisms of 
eurozone financial governance through the Stability and Growth Pact (SGP), with a focus on 
centralization vs. decentralization and incentive structures in the European Union (EU). 
We first construct a Stackelberg game model played by n Ministries of Finance (MOF) in n 
eurozone member countries as the first movers, and the European Central Bank (ECB) as the 
second mover. We then show the following basic intuition. The Government in each country can 
create growth (economy) in its own country, which means an increase in GDP (100% 
self-benefit), by increasing government spending in its own country, but this increases inflation, 
and the value of the euro falls. Since these effects are shared equally by euro countries (the cost 
is shared equally), there exists an incentive to cut corners on reducing the issuance of public 
debt (a free ride on other countries). We see that an increase in the number n of the Ministries of 
Finance (MOF) or the number n of nations will lead to a more severe free-rider problem. 
 Following this framework, we analyze a solution to the free-rider problem through the 
penalty scheme in the SGP. Of course, when there exists an executor who commits himself to 
and enforces the penalty schemes in the SGP, the first best solution can be achieved, as the 
literature shows (e.g. Bolton and Dewatripont (2005) and Holmstrom (1982)). However, as we 
described, “re-discussion (voting)” was conducted as to whether the penalty scheme should 
actually be imposed on the deviating country or not. In this case, the commitment not to conduct 
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ex-post renegotiation on the penalty is impossible. When the major powers, Germany and 
France, break the fiscal rule in the SGP (by excessive government spending), ex-post 
renegotiation may occur. At that time, a renegotiation gain will exist. In exchange for 
side-payments to other countries by Germany and France, no large penalty, or a significant 
reduction in the amount of the penalty will ensue. We characterize the second best solution as a 
situation where a commitment not to renegotiate penalties ex-post is impossible. The optimal 
solution shows that “limited sovereignty” should be imposed on the high marginal cost country 
for the issuance of public debt. 
 Lastly, we derive the parameter conditions for optimizing the current EU (European Union) 
allocation of authority, or “divided authority structure,” which consists of Monetary 
Centralization (ECB) and Fiscal Decentralization (the Ministries of Finance in each country). 
From a global equilibrium payoff comparison, we find that what is effective is governance 
based on “relative sovereignty,” either where there is a centralization and decentralization 
structure in which several governance bodies (the ECB and the Ministries of Finance) coexist or 
where there is a division of authority as the basic organizational structure and the main body 
governs with leading sovereignty depending on the contingency. 
 
1.1 Related Literature 
Dewatripont (2001) explains an optimality of the divided authority between the MOF and the 
Central Bank (e.g. the Deutsche Bundesbank - The Central Bank of Germany) in one MOF and 
Central Bank setting. Motivated by his lecture, we have constructed an extended model 
consisting of n Ministries of Finance (MOF) in n eurozone member nations and the European 
Central Bank (ECB), and explain the free-rider problem among the n member nations as a 
prisoner’s dilemma, which is essential not only to our analysis but also regarding urgent policy 
issues in the present EU. With this, we analyze a solution to the free-rider problem through the 
penalty scheme in the SGP, and derive a second best solution where a commitment not to 
renegotiate penalties ex-post is impossible; this is also today’s urgent issue. In addition, we 
examine the parameter conditions for optimizing the current EU (European Union) allocation of 
authority, or “divided authority structure,” which consists of Monetary Centralization (ECB) 
and Fiscal Decentralization (the Ministries of Finance in each country). Our finding is that what 
is effective is governance based on “relative sovereignty,” either where there is a centralization 
and decentralization structure in which several governance bodies (the ECB and the Ministries 
of Finance) coexist or where there is a division of authority as the basic organizational structure, 
and the main body governs the EU with leading sovereignty depending on the contingency. This 
finding may be viewed as an application of Aghion and Bolton (1992)’s “Contingency 
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Dependent Control”, or “Contingent Control Shift” idea to problems in the political economy.3 
 
2. Basic Model using Contract /Game Theory 
 
2.1 Model Setting 
 
As member players of the European Union (EU), there exist the European Central Bank 
(ECB) and the Ministry of Finance (MOF) of each nation. The European Central Bank (ECB) is 
an integrated organization of the central banks of member nations, with a function to manage 
the monetary policy in an integrated manner and to determine the policy rate (common interest 
rate) i .4 On the other hand, the Ministry of Finance (MOF) of each nation has the authority to 
control its own financial spending. So, let the financial spending level of the nation k  
be , 1, 2,...,kd k n= . This is a structure of monetary centralization and fiscal decentralization. 
The GDP (Gross Domestic Product, i.e. output) of the nation k  is expressed as 
,   1, 2,...,k kx d i k n= − = , which is financial spending (financing through the issuance of 
national bonds) minus the policy rate i .5 The inflation rate (price increase rate) kπ  of the 
nation k  is expressed as ,  1, 2,....,k kd i k nπ β= − = , 6  and we assume 1β > . 7  Note that 
since inflation means price increases, this is equivalent to a drop in monetary value, that is, “the 
value of the euro”. 
Next, let the objective function of the nation k ’s Ministry of Finance (MOF) be ( )2
2k k
x dα− . 
This means that the nation k ’s MOF puts much value on an increase in GDP, so called 
“economic growth” kx , and that the issuance of public debt and the increase in outstanding 
                                                 
3 For discussion on the link between political economics and incomplete contracts, see the panel slides on 
Incomplete Contracts and Political Economy at Grossman and Hart at 25 (2011). 
4 The central bank of each nation can be regarded as an agent who directly implements the policy rate 
decided by the ECB. As a form of business organization, Suzuki (2011) referred to it as “integration”, 
where top management gives the orders and section managers simply accept and execute their orders. 
5 This is basically an analysis of a 45-degree line, in which financial spending (government spending) 
increases total demand while rising interest rates reduce total demand through a decline in private 
investment, a reflection of the fact that they alter the equilibrium GDP. 
6 This is the view that an increase in financial spending and a decrease in the policy rate will lead to a 
growth in total demand and put upward pressure on commodity prices. 
7 The assumption 1β > means that the ECB’s policy rate has more effect on inflation control (price 
stabilization of the euro) π ↓  than on GDP (economy) x , which is an indicator of the real economy. 
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public debt will cause increasing costs ( )2
2 k
dα  for the MOF. The interpretation of the issuance 
cost of public debt ( )2
2 k
dα is as follows. αis an interest rate for public debt, and also a 
parameter which characterizes the size of the marginal cost of the issuance of public 
debt.
( )2
2
kd is the cost for obtaining the approval or acceptance of the parliament on increasing the 
issuance of public debt (government financial spending). This means that increasing public debt 
kd is costly in two ways. 
Meanwhile, let the objective function of the European Central Bank (ECB) be 
( )22
12
n
k
k
dαµπ
=
− − ∑ . Because the ECB is a “guardian of commodity prices”, whose mission is 
to “maintain the value of the euro”, the first term quadratic loss 2µπ− means that 
inflation/deflation (price increases/decreases) and the change in the value of the euro are viewed 
as costs for the ECB. Here, µ  is a parameter which refers to the size of the social cost of 
inflation. The second term means that the ECB also recognizes the amount of government debt 
of each nation as a cost. The most important point is that the MOF is a player with an 
economic-expansion bias in the sense that the MOF’s objective includes x (GDP, 
economy/growth) but not 2µπ− (cost of inflation), while the European Central Bank (ECB) is 
a player with a price-stability (stability of the euro’s value) bias in the sense that the ECB’s 
objective includes 2µπ−  but not x .8 In summary, there is a conflict of interests between the 
MOF and the ECB. 
We have specified the players of the game (Ministry of Finance 1,2,..,k n= , European 
Central Bank), the strategies of each player (financial spending through the issuance of public 
debt , 1, 2,..,kd k n= and a single policy rate i ), and the objectives which each player pursues. As 
for the time structure (timing), the MOF of each country simultaneously and independently 
chooses its own financial spending 1 2, ,.., Nd d d , and, after observing this, the European Central 
Bank chooses a common policy rate i . This reflects that a policy rate can be adjusted much 
more quickly than financial spending (the issuance of public debt).  
                                                 
8 This is an extreme hypothesis for simplification. It is possible to generalize it to let the Ministry of 
Finance consider economic growth and price stability (stability of the value of the euro) as :1γ γ− , 
where1 2 1γ≤ ≤ and let the European Central Bank consider them as1 :γ γ−  in a weighted manner. 
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 Throughout section 2.2, the following basic mechanism will be theoretically described. The 
government in each country can create economic growth in their own country, which means an 
increase in GDP (100% self benefit) by increasing government spending in their own country, 
but inflation will increase and the value of the euro will fall. These effects are shared equally by 
euro countries (costs are shared equally). Hence, there exists an incentive for cutting corners on 
reducing the issuance of public debt (free ride on other countries). 
 
2.2 Model Solution by Backward Induction  
 
In this section, we solve the basic model by using the backward induction in one MOF case, 
two MOF case, and n MOF case, and point out that the “free-rider problem” occurs in 
equilibrium under the common currency (euro) system. 
 
2.2.1   1 MOF and ECB case9 
 
Timing10: 
T=1 The Ministry of Finance (MOF) chooses financial spending d . 
T=2 The European Central Bank (ECB) chooses the interest rates (policy rate) i . 
 
This is the Stackelberg Game played by the Ministry of Finance (MOF) and the European  
Central Bank (ECB).  
T=2: Given the financial spending d in T=1, the ECB chooses the interest rates (policy rate) i . 
       
{ }
2
2max
2i
dµπ α− −  
Substituting d iπ β= − into the payoff function and optimizing with respect to i , we have the  
First Order Condition for the optimality: 0d iβ− =  
Therefore, the best response function by the ECB in T=2 is ( ) di d
β
∗ =  
                                                 
9 This 1 MOF+ECB version borrows an idea from Dewatoripont (2001). 
10
 This timing is due to the fact that interest rates can be adjusted much more quickly by the ECB than by 
the fiscal policy in each sovereign nation. 
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This shows that inflation (the fall in the value of the Euro) due to the increase in financial  
spending d in T=1 is suppressed by the policy rate i  in T=2. 
 
T＝1: The Ministry of Finance (MOF) expects the best response function by the European 
Central Bank (ECB) in T=2 and chooses the optimal financial spending.  
{ }
( )( )
( )
2 2
max  
2 2
 s.t.  
d
d dx d i d
di d
α α
β
∗
∗
− = − −
=
 
That is, the Ministry of Finance (MOF) solves 
{ }
2
max  
2d
d dd α
β
 
− − 
  .
 
The First Order Condition for the optimality is 
11  0dα
β
 
− − = 
   
 
Hence, the optimal solution in T=1 is *
1 11  d
α β
 
= − 
 
and the equilibrium policy rate by ECB  
in T=2 is 
1 11  i
αβ β
∗  = − 
 
. The solution concept is, of course, Sub-game Perfect Equilibrium, 
which corresponds to *
1 11  d
α β
 
= − 
 
 and ( ) di d
β
∗ = . 
 
Note: The Nash Equilibrium of a Simultaneous Move Game between MOF and ECB is 
1 1,  N Nd i
α αβ
= = , which is higher than in the case of the Stackelberg Game. In the 
Stackelberg game, the follower (ECB), after observing the leader (MOF)’s move (the fiscal 
spending in T=1), cancels out some of the effect of the increase in GDP through the increase in 
the policy rate ( ) di d
β
∗ = . Expecting this rationally, the MOF only adopts the optimal fiscal 
expenditure (the issuance of public debt) in order to maximize
2
2
dx α− ( )( )
2
 
2
dd i d α∗= − − . 
In other words, the ECB has the authority to increase the policy rate, and suppress the incentive 
for the MOF to increase fiscal spending in T=1.11  
                                                 
11 Dewatripont (2001) explains an optimality of the divided authority between the MOF and the Central 
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Let us figure out the argument so far by using the best response functions. The best response 
function by the ECB ( ) di d
β
∗ =  is depicted in Figure 1. Expecting this, the MOF chooses the 
optimal fiscal spending level *
1 11  d
α β
 
= − 
 
 in T=1, which maximizes the difference 
between 
2
1
2 2
d dd dα α − = − 
 
and ( ) di d
β
∗ = . We can confirm that the marginal benefit 
1 dα− obtained by increasing d  is balanced by the marginal increase in the optimal response 
1
β
 at *
1 11  d
α β
 
= − 
 
. The equilibrium interest rate is then ( )* 1 11  i d
αβ β
∗  = − 
 
. We 
depict this Stackerberg equilibrium point as S1 (for one MOF case). The Nash equilibrium point 
is N in the figure. 
 
Figure1 
 
 
 
    Policy Rate 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                          Financial Spending 
 
2.2.2 2 MOFs and the ECB  
 
 The time line is as follows, and we solve this game by backward induction. 
                                                                                                                                               
Bank (e.g. the Bundesbank in West Germany) in one MOF and Central Bank. 
i  
0  
( ) di d
β
∗ =  
Best Response Function by ECB 
* 1 11  d
α β
 
= − 
 
 
1 11  i
αβ β
∗  = − 
 
 
1Nd
α
=
 
1Ni
αβ
=  
d  
Ｎ 
S1 
2
2
dd α−  
•  
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       T=1                                    T=2 
  
Ministries of Finance, MOF1 and MOF2      European Central Bank (ECB)   
choose financial spending 1 2,d d .        chooses the common policy rate i . 
 
T=2: Given the financial spending 1 2,d d of MF1 and MF2, the ECB chooses the interest rate 
(policy rate) i . 
Given the first period of financial expenditure 1 2,d d , and in accordance with the common  
policy rate i , which the ECB chooses in T=2, the expected inflation rate in countries  
1, 2k =  in T=2 is ( )  1, 2  k kd i kπ β= − = . Since the average inflation rate is 
1 2 1 2
2 2
d d iπ π β+ += − , the ECB solves the following problem. 
{ } { }
2 22 2 2 2
1 2 1 2 1 2 1 2max max
2 2 2 2i i
d d d d d diπ πµ α µ β α+ + + +   − − ⇔ − − −   
   
 
First Order Condition for the optimality is 1 2 0
2
d d iβ+ − = . 
Hence, the best response function by the ECB in T=2 is ( )* 1 21 2
1,
2
d di d d
β
+
= .  
This means that the ECB optimally raises the policy rate i  against the average inflation 
increase (which means a fall in the value of the euro) due to the increase in the first period of 
average financial spending 1 2
2
d d+
. 
  
T=1: The Ministry of Finance in each country 1, 2k =  expects the best response of the 
European Central Bank (ECB) in T=2 and simultaneously chooses the optimal financial 
spending.  
The problem is  
12 
 
{ }
( )
2 2
1 21max , 1,2     .t.  
2 2 2k
k k
k kd
d d d dx d i k s iα α
β
∗ ∗ +− = − − = =  
 
Optimizing 
2 21
2 2 2
k k k k
k k
d d d dx dα α
β
− + − = − − 
 
 with respect to , 1, 2kd k = , we have the  
First Order Condition:
1 11   0
2 k
dα
β
 
− − = 
 
. The solution is *
1 11 , 1,2
2k
d k
α β
 
= − = 
 
12 
Hence, the Sub-game Perfect Equilibrium of this game is  
* 1 11 , 1,2,
2k
d k
α β
 
= − = 
   
and ( ) 1 21 2
1 ,
2
d di d d
β
∗ +=  
We see that if the number of Ministries of Finance is two, equilibrium financial spending in T=1 
increases ( * *
1 1 1 11 1
2k
d d
α β α β
   
= − > = −   
   
), and the policy rate determined by ECB in T=2 
also becomes higher ( ( ) ( )* * *1 2 1 1 1 1, 1 12i d d i dαβ β αβ β
∗ ∗   = − > = −   
   
) 
 
Intuitive Explanation 
 While the GDP of its own country is obtained at 100% with an increase in financial spending 
for the MOF of each country, the increase in interest rates (inflation offset by an increase in 
interest rates) in T=2 by the ECB will be half of that in a situation where the Ministry of 
Finance is from one country. Thus, the costs of the euro falling due to inflation are equally 
shared by two countries. Then, the100% self-benefit vs. the 50% cost burden will lead to the 
“free-rider problem”, that is, an excessive financial incentive to spend. There exists an incentive 
for cutting corners on reducing the issuance of public debt (an incentive to free ride on other 
countries).  
 
Let us express this in a simple mathematical way. Each MOF 1,2k = simultaneously solves 
the following problem at T=1: 
{ }
2
1 21max    s.t.  
2 2k
k
kd
d d dd i iα
β
∗ ∗  +− − = 
 
 
                                                 
12The optimal fiscal spending in T=1 *, 1, 2kd k =  is the dominant strategy for each firm, irrespective of 
the opponent’s strategy. 
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The first order condition for the optimality on kd is 
1 11 0
2 k
dα
β
− − =  
Rearranging the left hand side, we have 

1 2 of SMCMR MC 100%
1 1 1 2k k kd i d dα α β
∗− − ∂ ∂ = − −
  
 
While the GDP of its own country is obtained at 100%, that is,1 kdα− , with an increase in 
financial spending, the increase in interest rates (inflation offset by an increase in interest rates) 
in T=2 by the ECB is one half, that is, ( )( )1 2 1 β  when the Ministry of Finance is from one 
country. Since the costs of the euro falling due to inflation are equally shared by two nations, 
the free rider problem (excessive fiscal spending) appears. 
We depict the equilibrium point as S2 (for the two MOF case) in the figure.  
 
Figure2 
 
 
 
   Policy Rate 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                          Financial Spending 
 
 
 
2.2.3 n MOF and ECB   
 
What happens if the number n of the Ministries of Finance (MOF) (or the number n of nations) 
increases? Then, each MOF simultaneously solves the following problem at T=1 
i  
0  
( )i d∗  
Best Response function by ECB 
* 1 11  d
α β
 
= − 
 
 
1 11  i
αβ β
∗  = − 
 
 
1Nd
α
=  
1Ni
αβ
=  
d       
N 
S1 
*
2
1 11  
2
d
α β
 
= − 
 
 
S2 
2
2
dd α−  
•  
14 
 
{ }
2
1 21max    s.t.  
2k
k n
kd
d d d dd i i
n
α
β
∗ ∗  + + ⋅⋅⋅ +− − = 
 
 
The first order condition for the optimality on kd is 
1 11 0kdn
α
β
− − =  
Rearranging the left hand side, we have 

1  of SMCMR MC 100%
1 1 1k k k
n
d i d d nα α β∗− − ∂ ∂ = − −
  
 
While the GDP of its own country is obtained at 100%, that is,1 kdα− , with an increase in 
financial spending, the increase in interest rates (inflation offset by an increase in interest rates) 
in the second period by the ECB is one nth , that is, ( )( )1 1n β  when the Ministry of Finance 
is from one country. The costs of the euro falling due to inflation are equally shared by n nations. 
Hence, the free rider problem will appear in a more serious way. Indeed we have the Subgame 
Perfect Equilibrium Solution *
1 11 , 1,2,..,kd k nnα β
 
= − = 
 
 and 
1 11i
nαβ β
∗  = − 
 
, which 
becomes higher as n  becomes larger.13 
Summarizing the argument of this section, we have the following proposition. 
 
Proposition1 
Under the common currency union with Monetary Centralization and Fiscal Decentralization, 
the free-rider problem for the issuance of public debt (excessive fiscal spending) occurs in 
equilibrium. As a result, the equilibrium policy interest rate also becomes higher. As the number 
of Euro member nations increases, the free-rider problem becomes severer. 
 
3. Commitment and Renegotiation on the Penalty Scheme in the Stability and 
Growth Pact (SGP) 
 
3.1. Commitment solution to the free rider problem (benchmark). 
  When only your own country deviates, you pay penalty charges F to the European 
Commission (EC). When other countries deviate, those countries pay penalty charges F to 
the European Commission (EC) and you receive the charges split by 1n − countries. 
The penalty scheme that your country faces is  
                                                 
13This result is consistent with the economic growth in the eurozone, the increase in member nations and 
the accompanying gradual increase in the policy rate until the summer of 2008, that is, before the Lehman 
shock. The policy rate was above 4% in the summer of 2008. 
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( ) ( )
if Your own country deviates
     
1 if One of the other countries deviatesk
F
s
F n
−
=  −
d
  
where ( )1 2, ,.., nd d d=d is the vector of fiscal spending kd by each country 1, 2,..,k n=
 
When there exists an executor who commits himself to and enforces such schemes, where 
the penalty is imposed on a country which deviates and the penalty (payment) is transferred to 
other countries that abide by the rule, the first best solution could be achieved.14  
 
3.2.  What is supposed to happen when a commitment not to conduct ex-post renegotiation 
on the penalty is impossible?  
As we discussed in the introduction, “re-discussion (voting)” was actually conducted as to 
whether the penalty should be imposed on the deviating country or not. When the major powers, 
Germany and France, break the fiscal rule of the SGP (by excessive government spending), 
ex-post renegotiation may occur. At that time, a renegotiation gain will exist. In exchange for 
side-payments to other countries by Germany and France, no large penalty ( F ), or a significant 
reduction in the amount of the penalty, will ensue. So, we set up the following hypothesis. 
 
Hypothesis: Let the bargaining power of the European Commission (EC) be [ ]0,1λ∈ , and the  
bargaining power of all of the remaining n-1 member nations be 1 λ− . When Germany (and 
France) “follows and accepts” the penalty, the penalty F is paid to the European Commission 
(EC) and shall then be allocated to the European Commission (EC) and the other n-1 countries 
in the portion of :1λ λ− . When the penalty is not followed and ( )1 Fλ−  is paid to the 
remaining n-1 member nations after direct renegotiation with them, the offer from the deviating 
country will be accepted by the n-1 nations and the payment by the deviating country can be 
lowered by ( )1F Fλ− − = 0Fλ ≥ . This is the same as the idea of “bid-rigging in tendering” 
or “collusion in an auction”. Then, the ex-post penalty scheme becomes weaker and it becomes 
difficult to suppress ex-ante fiscal incentives at the proper level. 
                                                 
14This is a solution to the moral hazard (free-rider problem) in teams through a penalty scheme. For 
various forms of penalty schemes, see Bolton and Dewatripont (2005). 
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Now, we analyze how much fiscal discipline can be maintained through this “penalty scheme 
with ex-post renegotiation”. 
 
Partial analysis: We focus on a case where equilibrium renegotiation, led by country Lα , is 
induced.15 
Let *
1 11 ,   ,
2k k
d k L H
α β
 
= − = 
 
 be the dominant strategy (Nash) equilibrium financial 
spending level of types ,L Hα α
16 when the number of countries is ( )2  ,L Hn α α=  
Letting Hd  be the financial spending level of country Hα , which the SGP intends to support 
(i.e. fiscal budget), *
1 11
2H H H
d d
α β
 
≤ = − 
 
　 (the free-rider level), should be satisfied. Then, 
the amount of penalty F  is set while it is taken into consideration that country Lα deviates 
from the SGP and renegotiation is executed between countries Lα and .Hα
17 
Now, we have the incentive constraint for country Hα to support the financial spending 
(fiscal budget) level Hd suggested by the SGP  
( )
( ) ( )
*
2
Substantial Penalty
2
2
Substantial P
Deviation Gain from  to 
1 1 2 10 1 1 1
2 2 2 2
1 1 1           1 1 1
2 2 2 2
H H
H
H H H
H H
H
H H
H
d d
F d d
d d F
α
λ
α β α β
α
λ
α β β
    
∆ ≤ ⇔ − − − ≤ − −    
    
    
⇔ − − − − ≤ −    
    


enalty

 
To support the financial spending level of at least Hd , the amount of the penalty F  
                                                 
15 We assume that equilibrium renegotiation is induced. Our context is an international setting, so it is an 
“incomplete contract” situation. Hence, “equilibrium renegotiation” would be more natural than 
“renegotiation-proof”. 
16Sinceα is the marginal cost parameter for the issuing of public debt, Hα means a high marginal cost 
country, and ( )L Hα α≤ means a low marginal cost country for the issuance of public debt. 
17The modeling is based on actual experience in 2002-2003when the major powers (Germany and France), 
which correspond to low marginal cost Lα countries, failed to abide by the SGP’s fiscal rule. 
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( ) ( )
*
2
2
Deviation Gain from to
1 1 11 1 1
2 2 2 2
H H
H
H H
H
d d
F d dαλ
α β β
    
− = − − − −    
    

   
 
is required, and is defined as ( )HF d . 
From comparative statics, we have ( ) 0H HF d d∆ ∆ < , which is to say, when you intend to 
reduce the financial spending level Hd , or intend to enhance the fiscal discipline of country Hα , 
the amount of penalty F should be increased. 
Now, when the incentive constraint for country Hα  is binding (holding equality), country 
Lα has an incentive to deviate to the equilibrium dominant strategy level
  
* 1 11
2L L
d
α β
 
= − 
 
against ( ) ( )1 HF dλ− and Ld suggested to country ( )L Hα α≤ , which 
results in the incentive constraint on country Lα  not being satisfied. That is 0L∆ ≥ ,
18 which 
is specifically as follows: 
  ( ) ( ) ( )
*
2
2
Substantial Penalty
Deviation Gain from  to 
1 1 11 1 1
2 2 2 2
L L
L
L L H
L
d d
d d F dα λ
α β β
    
− − − − ≥ −    
     

 
At this time, a side-payment of ( ) ( )1 HF dλ− emerges in the ex-post renegotiation between 
countries Lα and Hα . For the side-payment from the country in violation to other countries in 
ex-post renegotiation, it is assumed that unnecessary spending (excess burden) 0ξ ≥  occurs 
for each unit.19 
                                                 
18As Lα is smaller than Hα , this inequality 0L∆ >  tends to hold. This implies that the major powers 
with smaller marginal costs L Hα α< , such as Germany and France, could easily block the imposition of 
sanctions through collusion (the formation of a blocking coalition) among eurozone countries before the 
vote at the Financial Ministers Council. In other words, an asymmetry in Lα and Hα is essential to this 
argument. 
19This idea is based on Tirole (1992) and Laffont and Tirole (1991). If 0ξ = , we can attain the first best 
efficiency, similar to the Coase theorem (1960). In our international setting especially, a negotiation or 
persuasion setting, the transaction cost 0ξ >  is a natural assumption. Also, this 0ξ >  has a similar 
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Total welfare in EU countries, which corresponds to financial spending levels *Ld and 
( )*H Hd d≤ , is expressed by the following formula where growth (economy, GDP), inflation, 
the costs of the issuance of public debt and the dead weight cost are added. 
( ) ( )
( ) ( )
( ) ( )
22 2
2 2 2* *
*
B)
A)
C)
1
2 2 2
1
2 2 2
L L
L
L H L H
L L H H H
H H
L H H H
d dx x F d
d d d d
d i d i i F d
π π
α α µ ξ λ
α α µ β ξ λ
   + − + − − − −    
    
     +   = − − + − − − − − −         



（
（
（
 
Since the policy rate is chosen by the ECB so that 
*1
2
L H
d d
i
β
 +
=   
 
, the second term (B) is 
zero in equilibrium. The Stability and Growth Pact (SGP) sets the amount of penalty F so that 
the financial spending level Hd is sustained in equilibrium where the difference between the 
first term, total surplus (A) of the Ministries of Finance in both countries ,L Hα α and the third 
term (C), the dead weight cost, in the above formula will be maximized. 
 Now, we have the First Order Condition for the optimality: 
( ) ( )

( ) ( )
marginal demarginal effect on the payoff marginal effect on the payoff
     of MOF of  country     of MOF of  country
1 1           1 1 0
2 2
1 11 1
2 2
L H
H H H
H H H
d F d
d F d
α α
α ξ λ
β β
α ξ λ
β β
  ′− + − − − − = 
 
  ′⇔ − + − − = − 
 

　
ad weight cost

 
As the First Order Condition for Hd shows, the fiscal discipline of Hd d= and the required 
amount of the penalty ( )HF d  are determined so that the marginal increase in total surplus 
and the marginal increase in dead weight cost will be balanced. 
Substituting ( ) ( ) 1 11 1 2H H HH
F d dλ α
α β
  ′− = − − −  
  
 into the above condition,  
                                                                                                                                               
role to the “wealth constraint” in Aghion and Bolton (1992). 
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we have an explicit solution for optimal fiscal discipline (fiscal budget) *Hd  
 ( )*
FB level for H Dominant Strategy Level 
               for H
1 1 1 1 11 1    *
1 1 2H H H
d ξ
ξ α β ξ α β
   
= − + − ⋅⋅⋅⋅ ⋅   + +   
 
 
From ( )* , we can read the following messages. First, the targeted fiscal discipline level 
*
Hd is weighted by the first best level and the dominant strategy level (the free-rider level) in the 
proportion of1:ξ . As ξ is larger, the divergence of *Hd from the first best is more acceptable. 
The interpretation is that as the dead weight cost ξ is larger with renegotiation, the amount of 
the penalty cannot be increased.  
Second, as Hα is larger, the optimal fiscal discipline 
*
Hd for the high marginal cost country 
Hα becomes harder, i.e. the fiscal budget 
*
Hd assigned to country Hα  becomes harder. This 
implies that when the high marginal cost country Hα  loses the trust of the international bond 
market, and the interest rate Hα for its public debt goes up (the price goes down), the fiscal 
sovereignty for the high-cost country Hα  should be limited. In this sense, the solution ( )*  
optimally involves the idea of “limited sovereignty”. 
Third, as β is larger, the optimal fiscal discipline *Hd for the high marginal cost country 
Hα becomes greater, i.e. the fiscal budget 
*
Hd assigned to country Hα  can be relaxed. 
The interpretation is as follows. When β is higher, the ECB can suppress inflation sufficiently 
and stabilize the value of the Euro through the policy rate i .20 Hence it is not necessary to 
impose a hard budget to suppress the fiscal spending of country Hα . Rather, the fiscal budget 
should be relaxed in order to induce economic growth. 
Finally, as the European Commission (EC)’s portion λ becomes larger, the effect of the 
penalty scheme becomes weaker since a country in violation can easily buy countries with small 
                                                 
20 Remember that the inflation rate is formulated as x iπ β= −  
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amounts of substantive reallocation. Hence, the amount of the penalty F  becomes larger by the 
amount of the European Commission’s portionλ . 
Summarizing the argument of this section, we have the following proposition and corollaries. 
 
Proposition2 
Under the Stability and Growth Pact (SGP), a commitment not to renegotiate the penalty 
scheme ex post may be impossible. Then, equilibrium renegotiation occurs ex-post, which is led 
by the low marginal cost country Lα for the issuance of public debt. The second best solution of 
that regime shows an optimal fiscal discipline (fiscal budget) *Hd for the high marginal cost 
country Hα , which is set at the weighted average of the first best and the dominant strategy 
(free-rider) levels. In this sense, the optimal solution involves the idea of “limited sovereignty”. 
 
Corollary2.1 Effect of Hα on 
*
Hd  
As the cost for the issuance of public debt (the interest rate of public debt) Hα  becomes higher, 
the optimal fiscal discipline (fiscal budget) *Hd  for the high marginal cost country Hα  
becomes harder, i.e. the fiscal sovereignty for the high-cost country Hα should be more limited. 
As the interest rate of public debt Hα becomes lower, the limitation on fiscal sovereignty should 
be more relaxed. 
 
Corollary2.2 Effect ofβ  on *Hd  
The more sufficiently the ECB can suppress inflation and stabilize the Euro value through the 
policy rate, the more the optimal fiscal discipline (fiscal budget) for the high marginal cost 
country Hα can be relaxed. 
 
4. Authority Allocation in EU and Optimal Governance Structure 
 
So far, we have preceded our analysis given a framework of Monetary Centralization (ECB) 
and Fiscal Decentralization (a Ministry of Finance in each country). In this section, we 
endogenously consider the structure of the allocation of authority in the EU in the framework of 
incomplete contracts. 
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First Best Regime  
The Ministry of Finance (MOF) and the European Central Bank (ECB) take cooperative actions 
to maximize 
2
2
2
dx µπ α− − , which is the net payoff obtained by a representative citizen, 
combining GDP, inflation and the cost of the issuance of public debt.  
{ } { }
( ) ( )
2 2
22
, ,
max max  
2 2d i d i
d dx d i d iµπ α µ β α− − ⇔ − − − −  
The First Order Conditions for the optimality are  
 ( )1 2 0d i dµ β α− − − =  for d , 
( ) ( )1 2 0 2 1d i d iβµ β µ β β− + − = ⇔ − =  for i . 
The second formula is substituted into the first formula:  
1 11 1 0  1FBd dβ α
α β
 
− − = ⇔ = − 
 
 
In the first best regime, an increase in government spending due to the issuance of public debt is 
suppressed by internalizing the negative impacts on inflation. From ( )2 1FBd iβµ β− = , the 
policy interest rate is also suppressed by internalizing the negative impacts on economic 
growth (GDP). 
2
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 11 1
2 2 2
FB FBi d
β βµ β α β βµ αβ β β µ
      
= − = − − = − −      
      


 
These cooperative solutions (that is, first best solutions) are implementable if the “binding 
contract” could be written ex ante and the parties could commit themselves to it. This is because 
cooperative behavior can be enforced by using sanctions that impose huge fines against players 
that deviate from these agreed solutions. However, relations between nations are complex, 
involving political negotiations and domestically sensitive issues, so there always exists a high 
transaction cost. In summary, this is an incomplete contract situation, where the parties cannot 
write and commit ex ante state contingent contracts that cover all possible contingencies. Indeed, 
as we analyzed in section 3, ex ante penalty (sanction) schemes for deviant behavior cannot be 
committed, but only renegotiated ex post. So, the first best solution cannot be implemented. The 
next question is: Which of the following regimes (authority allocation) is the closest to "First 
Best"? In other words, which is the most efficient from the viewpoint of governance costs? We 
analyze the question using the idea of incomplete contract theory à la Grossman and Hart (1986), 
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Aghion and Bolton (1992) and Aghion and Tirole (1997).  
 
Question: Which of the following regimes (authority allocation) is the closest to "First Best"? 
1. All authority is allocated to the ECB. The ECB determines the financial spending level (the 
issuance of public debt) as well as policy rates.  
2. All authority is allocated to the Finance Ministers Council. The Finance Ministers Council 
determines government spending and policy rates at the same time. 
3. “Basic model”, Monetary Centralization (ECB) and Fiscal Decentralization (a Ministry of 
Finance in each country)  
 
Regime 1: ECB-Integration: The ECB has all the authority. 
The European Central Bank "ECB" chooses ( ),i d to maximize its own objective function, 
2
2
2
dµπ α− −  in a centralized manner. 
The problem is 
{ } { }
( )
2 2
22
, ,
max max
2 2i d i d
d dd iµπ α µ β α
   
− − ⇔ − − −   
   
 
The First Order Conditions for the optimality are  
 ( )2 0d i dµ β α− − − =  for d , 
( )2 0d iβµ β− =  for i .  
Hence, the solution is 0ECB ECBd i= = . 
The major goals of the European Central Bank are to suppress inflation, stabilize the value of 
the euro and reduce government debt (the issuance of public debt). As any increase in GDP 
(economic growth, economy) is not included in the goals, financial spending is set at 
0d = while any increase in GDP is ignored. Inflation will be zero and the value of the euro will 
be stable, but the economy will not grow, causing economic stagnation. Financial spending at 
0d =  will produce the worst outcome from the viewpoint of the goals of the Ministry of 
Finance. The net payoff that representative citizens obtain is
2
2 0
2
dx µπ α− − = . 
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Regime 2: MOF-Integration: The Finance Ministers Council has all authority.   
The problem when the Ministries of Finance collectively choose ( ),i d is  
{ } { }
2 2
, ,
max max  
2 2d i d i
d dx d iα α
   
− ⇔ − −   
   
 
The First Order Conditions for the optimality are  
 1 0dα− =  for d  
1 0− <  for i  
Hence, MOF
1d
α
=
 
and MOF 0i = are the solutions. 
The interpretation is the opposite of that in Regime 1. The major goals of the Ministry of 
Finance are GDP increase (economic growth) and the prioritizing of the economy (= x ). The 
suppression of inflation ( 2µπ− ) and the stability of the value of the euro are not included in the 
goals. Hence, the zero interest rate MOF 0i =  is set at the largest possible government spending 
MOF 1d
α
= without taking the suppression of inflation and the stability of the value of the euro 
into consideration.  
The net payoff that representative citizens obtain is 21 
2 22
2 1 1 1 1 1 1
2 2 2
dx µµπ α µ α
α α α α α
     − − = − − = −     
     
 
When the equilibrium level of the financial spending of the regimes is compared, we have 
  

MOF * * ECB
First Best ECB authority
  RegimeMOF authority n MOF vs. ECB 1 MOF vs. ECB
1 1 1 1 11 1 0FBkd d d d dnα α β α β
   
= > = − > = − = > =   
   


 
 
 
Regime 3: Current status = "Fiscal Decentralization + Monetary Centralization" (the two- 
period game in Section 2). 
                                                 
21When the social cost of inflation µ  is large enough ( 2µ α>  ), the net equilibrium payoff of this 
regime is negative. When µ  is small enough, which corresponds to the phase of recession and 
depression, the net equilibrium payoff of this regime is positive. This is economically relevant.  
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Each Ministry of Finance 1, 2k = has the authority with regard to financial spending kd  and 
the European Central Bank (ECB) has the authority to select a common policy rate. This 
corresponds to a form of “division of authority”. The equilibrium payoff for each country is   
2 1 1 31 1 , 1,2
2 2 2 2
k
k
dx kα
α β β
  
− = − − =  
  
 
2
1,2
1 1 31 1
2 2 2
k
k
k
dx α
α β β=
    
− = − −    
   
∑  
The equilibrium payoff for the ECB is ( )
2 2 2
22
0
2 2 2
d d dd iµπ α µ β α α− − = − − − = −

 
Therefore, the net payoff that representative citizens obtain is, by synthetically considering  
growth (GDP), inflation, and the cost of the issuance of public debt, 
2
2 1 1 31 1
2 2 2 2
dx µπ α
α β β
  
− − = − −  
  
 
The equilibrium points of the three regimes (1, 2, and 3) are represented as ECB-I (regime1), 
MOF-I (regime2) and S2 (Monetary Centralization and Fiscal Decentralization, 2 MOF case) in  
Figure 3. Which equilibrium is the second best optimal depends on the parameter conditions. 
 
Figure3 
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* 1 11  
2
d
α β
 
= − 
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1 11  
2
i
αβ β
∗  = − 
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Parameter Conditions to Optimize “Current EU (European Union) Authority Allocation” 
 
From the above description, the parameter conditions to optimize the current EU (European 
Union) allocation of authority, or “divided authority structure”, which is fiscal 
decentralization and monetary centralization, are obtained by comparing the equilibrium 
payoffs among the three regimes as follows: 
 

ECB integration
EU divided authority
1 1 31 1 0
2 2 2α β β
  
− − >  
  

 and   
MOF integrationEU divided authority
1 1 3 1 11 1
2 2 2 2
µ
α β β α α
    − − > −   
   


 
 
Proposition3 The conditions to optimize the “Relative Sovereignty of the ECB and the Ministry 
of Finance” or the current “division of authority between monetary centralization and fiscal 
decentralization” are: 
 (1) 2µ α≥ and 3 2β ≥  or (2)  0 2µ α≤ ≤  and 1 1 60 2 4
2 3
µ
β α
 
< ≤ − −  
 
 
Proof See Appendix 
 
Intuitive Explanation 
Condition (1) 2µ α≥  means that the “social cost µ of inflation is higher than the issuance 
cost α of public debt.” Then it is better to provide the European Central Bank "ECB," which 
has a bias towards price stability, with authority to determine the common policy rate to 
sufficiently cover incentives for the suppression of inflation. On the other hand, when 3 2β ≥  
“policy rate i  sufficiently suppresses inflation”, it is not necessary to offset the margin for the 
increase in GDP and economic growth while the European Central Bank "ECB" controls 
authority on the fiscal spending of each country in order to suppress inflation and stabilize the 
value of the Euro, leading to 0ECBd = . Thus, the “divided authority structure” which allocates 
the authority on financial spending to each country becomes optimal. 
Condition (2)  0 2µ α≤ ≤  and 1 1 60 2 4
2 3
µ
β α
 
< ≤ − −  
 
 
When the social cost µ  of inflation is relatively large, the qualitative logic is the same as 
condition (1). The range over which the "Relative Sovereignty of the ECB and the Ministry of 
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Finance" is optimal is expanded and the range where the current “authority division structure of 
monetary centralization and fiscal decentralization” is justified is expanded. On the other hand, 
when the social cost µ of inflation approaches zero (i.e. 0µ → ), “MOF-Integration (MOF's 
Absolute Sovereignty)” is the optimal governance structure for any 1β > .  
 The Eurozone Finance Ministers Council has all authority and collectively chooses financial 
spending 1MOFd α= and the policy rate 0MOFi = . The constraint ( k kd d≤ ) in the SGP to 
suppress the financial spending of member nations to less than the target level kd  is temporarily 
removed.  
 
Interpretation of EU Centralization and Decentralization and Governance Mechanism 
 
We discuss the global solution mentioned above (parameter condition-dependent whole  
optimal solution) from the viewpoint of with whom and with what method EU governance is 
optimally performed by applying the ideas (state-dependent governance, Contingent Control 
Shift) in the paper on Corporate Governance by Aghion and Bolton (1992). 
The insight from our analytical results is as follows. The European Central Bank “ECB” and 
the Ministries of Finance in member nations would be the governance bodies. “Governance 
based on Absolute Sovereignty which gives absolute sovereignty to a specific body regardless 
of contingency” is not effective in our incomplete contract world. What is effective is 
governance based on “Relative Sovereignty”, either where there is a centralization and 
decentralization structure in which several governance bodies (the ECB and the Ministries of 
Finance) coexist or there is a division of authority as the basic organizational structure and the 
main body governs the EU with leading sovereignty depending on the contingency.  
In an incomplete contract world, a certain situation will lead to inefficient EU governance  
when any player has the exclusive initiative. Under severe conditions (economic slowdown) 
(μ→0), the MOFs can conduct EU governance more efficiently. Under conditions of excessive 
economic overheating (μ is large enough and β is small enough), the ECB can conduct EU 
governance more efficiently. Hence, the idea of "Contingency Dependent Governance" by 
Aghion and Bolton (1992) can be applied, thereby we can take “Relative Sovereignty” where 
the several main bodies, which have mutually opposing interests, such as the European Central 
Bank, the "ECB", and the Finance Ministers Council, coexist and a main body which conducts 
efficient governance governs the EU with leading sovereignty depending on the contingency.  
In summary, we have: 
 
27 
 
Contingency Dependent EU Governance 
 
 Normal Times: The actual structure in the European Union becomes optimal, where the 
unification of monetary policy is with the European Central Bank and the decentralization of 
fiscal policy is with the Ministry of Finance in each country. That is, it is a structure of 
monetary centralization and fiscal decentralization where the European Central Bank and the 
Finance Ministers Council coexist, and corresponds to S2 (regime 3) in Figure 3. 
Emergency (economic recession): The Initiative for EU governance moves to the Finance 
Ministers Council of member nations and the Finance Ministers Council handles the 
economic recession. The MOF-Integration regime becomes optimal, and corresponds to 
MOF-I (regime 2) in Figure 3. 
Emergency (economic overheating): The initiative for EU governance moves to the European 
Central Bank (ECB) and the ECB handles economic overheating. The ECB-Integration 
regime becomes optimal, and corresponds to ECB-I (regime 1) in Figure 3. 
 
Remark: 
 With measures where the SGP temporarily removed the framework ( k kd d≤ ) for financial 
spending of the member nations for an economic recovery, GDP growth and increased 
employment opportunities during the severe recession after the Lehman shock of 2008, some 
of the governance initiative moved to the Finance Ministers Council. In accordance with this 
movement, the European Central Bank, the "ECB", changed its axis of cooperative monetary 
policy from price stability to economic stimulus. The mechanism of governance based on 
Relative Sovereignty, where the main bodies (the European Central Bank and the Finance 
Ministers Council), which have mutually opposing interests, have intentionally been made to 
coexist and the initiative is moved to either main body depending on the contingency to 
exercise that initiative (“Contingent control shift”), is included in the EU structure where there 
is a partition between centralization and decentralization (governance structure). The 
mechanism indeed works effectively to some extent.    
 
5. Discussions 
 
5.1 The Possibility of Fiscal Integration or Fiscal Union 
 
We shall consider the possibility of Fiscal Integration or Fiscal Union, which theoretically  
corresponds to 1MOF + ECB model in section2, where a Stackelberg Game is played between  
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the Ministry of Finance (MOF) and the European Central Bank (ECB). The net payoff of this  
Regime is 
* *
2 22 *2
2 * *
2
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 11 1 1 1
2 2 2 2
d i
d dx d i αµπ α α
α β αβ β α β α β
       
− − = − − = − − − − − = −       
       
 
This payoff is always larger than that of Regime 3 ("Fiscal Decentralization + Monetary 
Centralization" (2MOFs + ECB model), because the net payoff of Regime 3 is 
1 1 31 1
2 2 2α β β
  
− −  
  
 and it follows that 
2
1 1 1 1 31 1 1    for 1
2 2 2 2
β
α β α β β
    
− > − − >    
    
 
In the figure, Point FI represents Fiscal Integration (Fiscal Union) and the ECB equilibrium  
point, whose net payoff is greater than that of Regime 3 (Fiscal Decentralization and Monetary  
Centralization) (Point S2). Economically, this means that the Financial Ministers Council (or  
unique fiscal budgetary authority) should directly control the financial policies of all Eurozone  
member nations, in order to internalize (free-riding) externalities among them. In other words,  
authority regarding financial policy itself should not be decentralized, but centralized into unique  
fiscal budgetary authority. 
 
Figure4 
      Fiscal Integration (Fiscal Union) +ECB regime 
 
 
   Policy Rate 
 
 
 
 
                                    
FI   
 
 
                          Financial Spending 
 
Why is this regime unattainable? In the financial governance of the Euro, each Euro member  
nation may derive some political benefit from its authority on fiscal policy and hesitate to 
i  
0  
( )i d∗  
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* 1 11  
2
d
α β
 
= − 
 
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=  
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αβ β
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delegate this fiscal authority (i.e. sovereignty) to some central authority, so fiscal integration or 
fiscal union may not be realized even though it is economically more efficient. This point seems 
to be the same as that referred to in the literature of the Theory of the Firm for managers and 
workers who fear and resist losing their private benefits in a shift from non-integration to 
integration.22 
Thus, we have the following corollary (of Proposition 3). 
 
Corollary 3.1 
If the Fiscal Union holds, efficiency will be enhanced under relative sovereignty (by ECB and 
Fiscal Union), because the free-rider problem under fiscal decentralization can be solved 
through the internalization of externalities. However, the Fiscal Union would not hold if the loss 
of political benefits to each euro member nation due to the loss of fiscal sovereignty by the 
fiscal integration (Fiscal Union) were large enough to induce member nations to break away. 
 
 
5.2 How could an Enforcement Mechanism be devised for “Contingency Dependent 
Governance”? 
 
In international contexts, there is no “world government” which designs and enforces 
international agreements. In other words, legal enforcement is impossible. Hence, the 
enforceability of “Contingency Dependent Governance” is a very important issue. We should 
consider some form of self-enforcing mechanism where players have an incentive to follow the 
agreement voluntarily. 
A hint can be obtained from a class of repeated game where nature chooses, at the beginning 
of each period and according to a certain distribution, the stage game that the players will play. 
The game is repeated stochastically and the players do not know which stage game they will 
play until nature chooses one. By using this class of game, Rotemberg and Saloner (1986) 
analyze the behavior of oligopolies in this repeated game situation, where there are observable 
shifts in industry demand at the beginning of each period. When the stage game is chosen 
stochastically, as in Rotemberg and Saloner (1986), players make a decision after nature has 
chosen the game that will be played in this period. Thus perfection should be checked for 
ex-post incentive constraints by the players. In our model, there are three possible ex-post stage 
games (Normal time, Emergency1 and Emergency2), as described above. Given conditional 
actions and payoffs for the ex-post stage games, the players play the ex-ante stochastic stage 
game. In the infinitely repeated game of the ex-ante stochastic stage game, it is possible to 
                                                 
22See, e.g., Hart and Holmstrom (2010) and Suzuki (2010) 
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check the self-enforceability of “Contingency Dependent Governance.”23 
 
5.3 A Comment on the Eurozone crisis from our model analysis 
 
Though the Eurozone crisis emerged in early 2010 from Greece, our paper shows its 
fundamental roots. The message which the n MOF-ECB model in section 2 gives is that a 
common currency with fiscal decentralization generates the economic cost of a severe free-rider 
problem, which concretely takes the form of higher fiscal spending than the first best level 
through the issuing of public debt by each member nation (MOF). Since this can result in a fall 
in the value of the euro (and an increase in the interest rate on public debt), the SGP has been 
incorporated so as to become a fiscal governance mechanism in order to prevent such a 
free-rider problem. 
Now, on the Greek financial crisis, Greece ( Hα country) should have abided by the fiscal 
budget rule H Hd d≤  in the SGP, but, in fact, there had been a large deviation H Hd d  
which was hidden with “forged evidence”. Eventually, the truth became clear to the market. 
This caused a sharp fall in prices and widely rising interest on Greek public debt. The difference 
in yield H Lα α− expanded greatly, where Lα is the interest rate on public debt in Germany. As 
a result, Greece had to be 0Hd ≅ and GDP fell significantly. The collapse of the Greek 
economy has caused a dramatic loss of trust in the euro, which could mean the end of that 
currency. However, ruin for the Greek economy has been prevented (i.e. Greece has been bailed 
out). 
In August 2011, the slowdown in the world economy triggered concern about the ability of 
much larger economies than Greece, like Spain and Italy, to remain solvent. This extension of 
the crisis was reflected in rising interest rate spreads on public debt (above the interest rate on 
German public debt). Though there is no simple solution to the eurozone crisis, we can present 
the following point from our analysis. 
From now on, the ex-ante limited sovereignty (ex-ante power restriction) derived from the 
analysis of section 3 on the second best optimal fiscal discipline in the SGP and the 
commitment to ex-post sanctions (commitment not to renegotiate it ex-post) will both be 
important. Then, of course, monitoring systems on the observance of the fiscal budget rule 
                                                 
23Nonetheless, it is noticeable that some formal agreements on the fiscal budget rule and the imposition of 
sanctions tend to be written between EU governments (including eurozone member nations). This 
suggests the difficulty with the self-enforcing mechanism as described above. 
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should be reinforced.24 
 
6. Concluding Remarks 
 
This paper used a Game/Contract Theory framework to analyze the mechanisms of eurozone 
financial governance through the Stability and Growth Pact (SGP), with a focus on 
centralization vs. decentralization and incentive structures in the European Union (EU). 
By constructing a Stackelberg game model played by n Ministries of Finance (MOF) in the n 
Euro zone member countries as the first movers, and the European Central Bank (ECB) as the 
second mover, we first expressed the basic intuition that the government in each country can 
create growth (economy) in its own country, that is, an increase in GDP (100% self benefit), by 
increasing government spending in its own country, but this will increase inflation and the value 
of the euro will fall. Since these effects are shared equally by euro countries (the cost is shared 
equally), an incentive to cut corners on reducing the issuance of public debt (a free ride on other 
countries) exists.  
Following this framework, we analyzed a solution to the free-rider problem through the 
penalty scheme in the SGP, and derived the second best solution when a commitment not to 
renegotiate penalties ex-post is impossible. It shows that “limited sovereignty” should be 
optimally imposed on the high marginal cost country for the issuance of public debt. We also 
had some comparative statics results. 
Lastly, we derived the parameter conditions for optimizing the current EU (European Union) 
allocation of authority, or “divided authority structure,” which consists of Monetary 
Centralization (ECB) and Fiscal Decentralization (the Ministries of Finance in each country). 
From a global equilibrium payoff comparison, we found that what is effective is governance 
based on “Relative Sovereignty,” either where there is a centralization and decentralization 
structure in which several governance bodies (the ECB and the Ministries of Finance) coexist or 
where there is a division of authority as the basic organizational structure and the main body 
governs the EU with leading sovereignty depending on the contingency. As a final remark, we 
discussed the possibility of “Fiscal Union (Fiscal Integration)” and the enforceability of 
“Contingency Dependent Governance” based on “Relative Sovereignty”. 
                                                 
24 As an another approach, Farhi et al (2012) “ Fiscal Devaluation” show that even when the exchange 
rate cannot be devalued like in Eurozone, a small set of conventional fiscal instruments can robustly 
replicate the real allocations attained under a nominal exchange rate devaluation. For example, the 
Ministry of Finance in the Eurozone has a value-added tax increase and a uniform payroll tax reduction 
available as equivalent to exchange rate devaluation. The current crisis in the Euro area has brought the 
option of fiscal devaluations to the forefront of policy, and indeed, Germany in 2006 and France in 2012 
implemented fiscal devaluations. The option of fiscal devaluation will enhance the effectiveness of the 
Eurozone financial governance through the penalty scheme (as specified in the Stability and Growth Pact), 
by relaxing the incentive constraints against free-riding via excessive government spending. 
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Appendix: Proof of Proposition 3 
 
We can obtain the parameter condition under which the divided authority structure is optimal, 
by comparing the equilibrium payoffs between three regimes (EU divided authority, MOF 
integration, and ECB integration). 

ECB integration
EU divided authority
1 1 31 1 0
2 2 2α β β
  
− − ≥  
  

and 
MOF integrationEU divided authority
1 1 3 1 21 1 1
2 2 2 2
µ
α β β α α
    − − ≥ −   
   


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
and 
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X
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Now let us explore which regime is optimal, depending on the parameter conditions. 
（Ⅰ）
21 0 2µ µ α
α
− ≤ ⇔ ≥  
When the social cost of inflation µ  is greater than the cost of the issuance of public debt 
2α , the equilibrium payoff under ECB-Integration（“Absolute Sovereignty” of ECB）is greater 
than the one under MOF-Integration（“Absolute Sovereignty” of MOF）.  
When
1 31 3
2 2
X β
β
= ≤ ⇔ ≥ , the current divided authority structure consisting of Monetary 
Centralization and Fiscal Decentralization, i.e. the “Relative Sovereignty” of the ECB and the 
1 3  1 2  1
2
X
β
=  
DAV  
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Ministries of Finance, becomes the optimal governance structure. 
When
1 31 3 1
2 2
X β
β
= > ⇔ < < ,ECB-Integration（ “Absolute Sovereignty” of ECB）
becomes the optimal governance structure. 
 
   Eq. Payoffs 
                    
 
 
 
                                       ECB-integration 
  
                    
 
 
 
（Ⅱ）
21 0 2µ µ α
α
− ≥ ⇔ ≤  
When the social cost of inflation µ  is smaller than the cost of the issuance of public debt 
2α , the equilibrium payoff under MOF-Integration（“Absolute Sovereignty” of MOF）is 
greater than the one under ECB-Integration（“Absolute Sovereignty” of ECB）. 
There then exists a cutoff value ( )* 1 3X ≤ which satisfies DA MOFV V= ⇔  
( )( ) 21 1 3 1X X µ
α
− − = − 2
23 4 0X X µ
α
⇔ − + = , and we have *
32 2 2
3
X
µ
α
 − − 
 = . 
From
2 20 1 1 0 1µ µ
α α
≤ − ≤ ⇔ ≤ ≤ , it follows that
 
3 3 30 1 2 2 4
2
µ µ
α α
 ≤ ≤ ⇔ ≤ − ≤ 
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Then, there exists a cut-off point X* ∈ [0,1/3] which divides the optimal regimes.  
When *
10
2
X X
β
< = ≤ , the “Relative Sovereignty” of the ECB and the Ministries of 
Finance is the optimal governance structure, but when *
1 1
2 2
X X
β
≤ = ≤ , MOF-Integration
（“Absolute Sovereignty” of MOF）is optimal.
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   Eq. Payoffs 
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